Possible Worlds, Divine Foreknowledge, and Determinism

[akirlu]

Somebody over on the philosophy group wanted a case made that God's foreknowledge of all events entails a deterministic view of the universe. Here's my shot at it.

Begin at The Beginning.

God exists, and nothing else exists, yet. But infinitely many created worlds are possible.

God, being omnipotent, can create any world He likes. And, having omniscient foreknowledge, God knows the full range of events that would occur in any world He might create. So, God looks at His possible worlds, and all their possible events, and eventually picks one world -- presumably differing from its infinitely many nearest neighbors only by single events or facts -- and creates it. The created world is now the actual world, with all its actual events and choices.

That means that for any single choice in this world, there was a possible world in which the choice went differently. But God did not create the possible world in which the choice went differently, he created the actual world. So this world exists at all only because of the particular choices made in it.

Trivially, that's true of any world. The world we're in now exists because of a bunch of choices went a particular way. My surname exists as what it is, only because I married my husband, and so on. But creation with Divine foreknowledge requires a much stronger claim than that. In the ordinary way, we think of my choice to marry my husband as only affecting what possible world exists *after* I make that choice. If we presume God created one particular world out of all possible worlds based on His foreknowledge, then my choosing to marry my husband also affects what world exists *before* I made that choice, right back to the beginning of the world. If I choose to marry him, the world and its entire history back to its beginning and on to its end, exists. If not, then not. So every single choice that occurs in this world exists only because that is the choice that is made (which God chose, in advance, to actualize). No other choice could have been made, because the world in which it was different never existed. The alternative choice was left in an uncreated world, based on God's foreknowledge of that world, and that choice.

So, God has used his foreknowledge to choose every single choice that occurs in the actual world. Every single choice that occurs in the actual world was pre-chosen by God before the beginning of the world. If that isn't predetermination, I don't know what is.

Comments

[mrissa.livejournal.com]

The idea of "foreknowledge" only seems to make sense to me if you're moving steadily and unidirectionally through the main time dimension. It's like saying that I have deepknowledge of my computer because I can see its depth and not just its length and height from here.

[akirlu.livejournal.com]

I'm afraid the concept of causation is abjectly dependent on moving, monodirectional time, as well. If you want to claim that the phrase "God created the world" makes any sense, it has to be within a framework of time. If there is no "A preceded B," there can be no "A caused B" either.

[mrissa.livejournal.com]

I would think that God would have to create the world with a framework of time rather than within a framework of time.

You create a house with studs in the walls, but that doesn't mean that you have to put the studs in starting with the northernmost and westernmost stud and work steadily south and east from there.

Writers create books with causality in them, but that doesn't mean that the writers have to write the first word on the first page first and the last word on the last page last.

[akirlu.livejournal.com]

"Creation" cannot be sensibly spoken of outside a framework of time. The very notion supposes that there was a time at which something did not exist. If there was no time at which it did not exist, then it needs must be uncreated, or so the argument goes for God.

[voidampersand.livejournal.com]

I could imagine God creating time. "In the beginning, God created the beginning." We cannot see before the beginning of our time, or after its end. We are bound to a timeline. But the whole notion of creation implies something greater, something that can imagine a beginning and make it so.

[akirlu.livejournal.com]

But the whole notion of creation implies something greater

No, I don't think that's true. At least in mortal terms, I can certainly imagine a creation that is greater than its creator. One could even argue specific cases. But I don't think there is anything inherent in the concept of creation that says the creator must be greater than the created.

[voidampersand.livejournal.com]

You're right. I was trying to say that we should not constrain a creator to human metaphors, but then I did so myself.

[akirlu.livejournal.com]

I was trying to say that we should not constrain a creator to human metaphors

So you would say that it is impossible to meaningfully ascribe any traits to a deity at all?

[voidampersand.livejournal.com]

Meaningful to whom? There is a good chance that our attempts at understanding the divine probably will be meaningful to us. Whether God considers our ideas to be correct is really up to Her. Your Meta May Vary.

[akirlu.livejournal.com]

I don't see how we can discuss the deity in a way meaningful to us if we are proscribed from using human metaphors. What other kind of metaphors do we have available?

[kalimac.livejournal.com]

"Creation" cannot be sensibly spoken of outside a framework of time.

At one point in the timeline of a story did the writer create it?

[akirlu.livejournal.com]

At what point did I claim that the linear time that inheres in the notion of creation needs to be the same linear time that operates within that creation?

[kalimac.livejournal.com]

If you don't claim it, then it seems to me that all your arguments (that a God-created universe is deterministic) collapse.

[akirlu.livejournal.com]

Not at all. What are you talking about?

[kalimac.livejournal.com]

Because even if God knows what we're going to do, we still have to choose it. That's not deterministic.

[akirlu.livejournal.com]

Ah, I see you've missed the entire point of my original post.

[kalimac.livejournal.com]

No. The entire point of your original post ... is wrong. I realize now God doesn't even have to be in a separate timeline for this to be so.

[akirlu.livejournal.com]

So can you point out where, given the presumption of Divine foreknowledge and possible worlds theory, the argument fails? Or do you mean merely to deny one or both of the premises?

[avram]

Arg, you dragged me into it.

An argument can be made, based in scripture, that God is not actually omniscient. Check out Genesis 18: 20-21, in which God says that he's heard that Sodom and Gomorrah are grievously sinful cities, and he's sending down some angels to to see whether what he's heard is true.

[voidampersand.livejournal.com]

An alternate position would be to embrace the Many Worlds hypothesis. God could have omniscient foreknowledge of infinitely many worlds, but it would still be our choice as to which of those worlds we experience.

[damienw]

Yeah! God can observe but chooses not to collapse the wave function: He let's us do that. Or cats.

[randy-byers.livejournal.com]

Yow! Neo-gnosticism?

[akirlu.livejournal.com]

I think that was meow-gnosticism.

[randy-byers.livejournal.com]

Woof!

[apostle-of-eris.livejournal.com]

When God created Adam, He paraded all the animals before him, to see what he would name them.
So -- how could an omniscient God not know?
My suggestion is that He chose not to look. An omniscient God certainly has the capability of *not* looking.
. . . and as I write, it occurs to me that Quantum Uncertainty is a wonderful creation for that.
Anyway, further exegesis is left as an exercise.

[akirlu.livejournal.com]

Um, the necessary premise of the question is that God does know what Adam will choose to call the animals. That's what foreknowledge means.

Possible Worlds, Divine Foreknowledge, and Determinism

[glastonburh.livejournal.com]

That said, how about this for a proposal:
Omnicient/Omnipotent Flying Spaghetti Monster creates a......totality......

Wheels are put into motion. Substance becomes a possibility. Likewise, time. Likewise, the possibility of sentient entities swimming about in the soup. Perhaps time is linear, perhaps not. Perhaps substance is observable, perhaps not. Perhaps sentient entities are capable of awareness of something resembling the totality of the cosmic stewpot. Perhaps not.

Let's say that the FSM knew all of the possible ways in which stuff would flow from the Creative Moment (after all, if One is *really* Omnicient/Omnipotent, wouldn't that sort of follow?). I'm not at all certain how that knowledge would impact thoughts/actions of those in the stewpot. Limits for this sort of thing seem to be a human thing.....

I am glad your neurons remain active, Ulrika.

Be Well, g

Re: Possible Worlds, Divine Foreknowledge, and Determinism

[akirlu.livejournal.com]

It's true: if you eliminate the Possible Worlds theory portion of the premises, then the argument I'm making doesn't work. Often the case, when you start eliminating premises.

Do I know you?

Re: Possible Worlds, Divine Foreknowledge, and Determinism

[glastonburh.livejournal.com]

Yes, Ulrika, you do know me, or at least you did. This is Mr. Head, considering all the MYRIAD worlds, and therefore, not eliminating possible worlds, but rather positing and infinite number and variety of them, known fully only to First Cause.

Again, I hope that this finds you and Hal well.

Best, g